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In the April 1979 issue of CSSH I proposed a theory: The fi nanc ia l se rvices of leadin g indigeno us banking firms were ind ispe nsable to the Mug hal state, and the di versio n by these firms of reso urces, bo th credit and trade, fro m the Mu gha ls to othe r po litical po we rs in the Indian s ubcontinent contributed to the downfa ll of the Mughal e mpire (p . 152). Jo hn F . Ric hards's artic le in the prese nt issue takes exception to th at theory, c hallenging the evide ntiary basis for my assert ions. Whi le stating that furt her research was ad mittedly necessary to test and fully substantiate the theory, I certai nly offered evidence th at these bankin g fi rms supplied wo rking capital to the e mpire and its officials for military campa igns, trade, co nstructio n , ka rkhanah (worksho p) production , and persona l loans. I also di sc ussed the bankers' regul atio n of the valuation , exchange . and c irculatio n of curre ncy . and partic ul arly the lwndi syste m of bills of exchange. The political pote nti al of these fi nanc ia l services -of the ir pe rforma nce o r nonperformance, and o n what terms -is obvious. Indeed , I c ited instances of po litical interacti o ns between banke rs and offic ia ls.
Richards concedes th at my analysis of the eighteenth-ce ntu ry acti vities of bankin g firms -the ir mi gratio n fro m Mug hal-controlled urban centers to o the rs; the ir ex te nsio n of credit and trade to ne w regio na l powe rs, inc luding the European trading co mpanies; the ir in vo lve ment in the collec tio n of land revenue -is accurate. He attac ks the theory, ho wever, by statin g that he canno t find "sufficient ' · evidence to support my assumptio ns about the services and importance of the banking firms in the sixtee nth and seventeenth centuries. He also attac ks the theory by stressi ng the empi re's acc umul ation of pe rm ane nt capital, altho ugh I did no t conte nd th at the em pi re depended upo n the pri vate sec to r fo r lo ng-te rm financ ing in those centuries.
Ric hards puts fo rward a "state finance" mode l of the Mu gha l economy. In thi s formal, bureauc ratic mode l, the state some ho w contro ls the bulk of the profi ts from the expansio n of trade, a lo ng with o the r accumu lated resources (p lunde r, tribute, land revenue), and it also contro ls the minting and ci rc ulati o n of curre ncy. The re are three problems with th is. In terms of economic I wane co thank John Leonard for his comments on this essay. theory, his model concentrates on the state's accumulation of capital and overlooks the credit system developed and controlled by private bankers and other financial specialists. Just as the eighteenth-century contraction of fiscal resources was accompanied by a tightening of credit facilities, the earlier expansion of the money supply had as its corollary an expansion of the system of credit, and hi s model does not account for that. In terms of economic practice, Richards simply delineates the state's financial institutions and normative goals: treasure was accumulated, there were treasuries and appointed treasurers, there were mints with designated mintmasters. What does this tell us about the economy, the way money was valued, exchanged, and circulated? Why downplay the nonofficial financial intermediaries who were essential at every leve l, even in his discussion , to make the model work? Other scholars working on the economic history of India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries do not question the existence of a well-developed system of finance and credit and extensive use of it; they , too , assume the existence and economic importance of "great firms " and find examples of them.
1 And, finally, Richards 's model does not provide adequately for the integration of the economy and the imperial structure. As his final sentences reveal , to argue that the Mughal state exercised strong centralized control over the economy and benefitted greatly from the seventeenth-century conjunction with its "corporate analogues," the English and Dutch East India companies, does little to explain the state's weakness in the eighteenth century.
Richards 's di sc ussion of the system of state finance begun under Akbar considerably overstates the role of the government and is economically and historically na· ive . Terming the empire "self-financing," he says (p. 292):
Imperi al officers utilized the skills of private bankers and others to assist them in the task of managing the vast funds at their disposal -but did not depend upon investment of funds, nor upon large long-term loans to operate the machinery of the state.
How did officials utilize these private skills, then, and what did the bankers get out of it? What about the provision of working capital and short-term credit? Although he mentions commercial groups and their services, at one point terming them "obviously essential" (p. 289), Richards again and again says that they were not important, and that the empire did not depend on them to any meaningful extent. Direct evidence, that is, official admission of dependence on banking firms, may indeed be hard to find in the sources. But what has happened to inference, that valued tool of histori ans, a tool especially useful when sources are scarce or likely to be reticent? K . N . Chaudhuri , whose carefu l, empirically based work commands respect, has written:
The high degree of centralization ach ieved by the Mu ghals in governme nt had a strong financial and monetary base. which was fostered by a long tradition of banking and commercial exc hange . It is inconcei vab le th at the state machinery dealing with even land revenue could have functioned properly without financi al intermediaries and an active market mechanism. The loss of Mughal state papers and lack of private comme rcial records has meant that much of this interaction ... is hidden from our knowledge.
2
The re is certainly evidence that the Mughal state and its officials utili zed the credit facilities of the banking firms, for both short-te m1 credit and the transmittance of funds within the e mpire . in the sixteenth and seventeenth ce nturies. 3 The question is, how necessary were these facilities to the state? It is hard to imagine that bullion, plunder, and collected reve nues were sent by messenge r or carted about by bullocks with military escorts when the sophisticated hundi system was available, and indeed we have many instances of emperors, officials, and tributary rulers sending official remittances -includin g funds from Mughal treasuries -via hundi . 4 Yet Ric hards asserts that ' ·most transfers of official funds were carried out by imperial messengers and armed escorts carrying coin or bullion rather than by resort to the private ne twork of bills of exchange offered by associated groups of moneychan gers· · (p. 297). But Irfan Habib , thoroughly fami li ar with the primary sources for the period , believes that the total amount transferred via hundis on behalf of the Mughal government and officials · ' ri valled , if it did not exceed. the money remitted for purposes of trade . " 5 And I draw attention again to evidence of the nobles· inde btedness to bankers in thi s period , 6 to Akbar 's failure to create government institutions to displace private bankers as chief creditors of nobles ,7 and to Habib 's (supported) belief that the Mughal state , in fact, "extended its fu ll protection to the creditor. " treasuries and mints did not ·'issue '' money in the sense of regulating its supply. Rather, the supply of money was governed by the supply of bullion. 9 The long-time stability of the Mughal silver rupee was not due to the state's successful maintenance of an artificial value for it; coinage at the Mughal mints was "free," and the value of the silver rupee was based directly on its weight.
10 Hence the continual need to remint older coinage, including reserves held in imperial treasuries, to produce sikka, or current, rupees. This need was clearly dictated by the controllers of the money market, the moneychangers and banke rs, who accepted older coins only at a discount, which they set. Irfan Habib 's careful discussion of the Mughal currency system of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries shows that the officials followed, or reacted to , the marke t syste m regulated by the bankers and moneyc hangers. The latter were closely associated with the Mughal mints; they may sometimes have managed them.
11 "Recognized" Hindu bankers (great firms?) were given the very lowest rate for mint charges (2 1 /6 percent , contrasted with 21h percent for Muslims and 3 percent for other bankers and money lenders):
12 the amounts for hundis were always stated in terms of c urrent sikka (also called hundwi) rupees, unlike other amounts and prices; 13 and revenue collectors demanded pure coin ''as defined by the moneychangers. "
14 These and numerous other instances cited by scholars show that it was the bankers and moneychangers, and not the state . who controlled the minting and circulation of currency. Richards seems to find the Persian chronicles and official Mughal sources adequate for reaching conclusions about the activities of banking firms. Thus , when confronted with evidence of fi scal services provided by bankers , he regards such activities as " unusual " and "a sharp divergence from imperial regulations" (p. 289). But historians can read the same sources and interpret them differently . When Richards reports (p. 294) that Mirza Raja Jai Singh 's army awaited treasury funds for five months without any reference in official de spatches to serious distress or recourse to private bankers, I infer that Jai Singh received short-term credit from local merchants or bankers. An army run s on its stomach , not its manuals . The commercial activities of Mughal nobles can be stressed, but agents, brokers, and merchants worked closely with them. 16 Although Mughal officials did impose a centralized system of market organization (p. 299) , a local merchant headed the urban tax collection in tandem with those officials. And my reading of the autobiography of the seventeenth-century Jain merchant -the Ardha Kathanak of Banarsidasis quite diffe rent from that of Richards, who cites an incident from it to evidence official persecution of merchants and a tense merchant-Mughal relationship. But that incident was followed by Mughal recall and rebuke of the official, and Banarsidas himself once benefitted from official intervention on behalf of travelling merchants .
17
Surely we can push our knowled ge of indigenous banking firms in India back into the seventeenth and sixteenth centuries 18 so that the significant questions now being raised about the hi storical roles of India 's indigenous banking firm s can be answered.
